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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The EU Electricity Directive of June 20034 imposes additional 
requirements that directly affect the German electricity supply industry (ESI). 
First, Germany must now establish a regulator for the industry. Second, 
negotiated Third Party Access (TPA) is no longer acceptable and must be 
replaced by regulated TPA from July 2004. Germany was successful in 
weakening the original force of this requirement, and the regulator is now only 
required to approve the methodology underlying the calculation of the network 
charges (clause 20(1)). Thereafter the level of the charges will be subject to ex 
post control. In anticipation of these developments the German Ministry of 
Economics prepared a “monitoring report” (BMWA, 2003), assessing the 
system of negotiated TPA in both the gas and electricity markets. This report, 
which should be interpreted as a political justification for further action, claims 
that the experiences in the electricity markets were modestly positive while in 
the gas market they were poor. In the electricity markets various parties agreed 
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on a network access agreement, but network charges are high and the 
institutional framework clearly violated the level playing field as it encouraged 
low margins in the commercial businesses and thereby discouraged entry. In the 
gas market, the existing network access agreement was felt to be discriminatory 
and negotiations on an improvement failed. 
The Ministry of Economics released the proposed modifications of the 
Energy Act in early 2004. It proposed that authority to regulate the ESI will be 
given to a new regulator which will be a part of the regulator for 
telecommunications and post services (RegTP). The new enlarged office will be 
called REGTP: Regulator for Electricity, Ga s, Telecommunications and Post 
services. The Ministry also laid out details of the proposed regulation, which 
plans to adopt a cost-based methodology set out by the network access 
agreement; in November 2004 the Ministry explicitly opened up the option to 
introduce incentive regulation. In practice this means that the regulator would 
have the authority to approve the (level of the) charges ex ante (instead of 
merely the method) which then stay valid for some predetermined period. 
Finally the Ministry proposes the minimal requirements on vertical unbundling 
laid down in the EU Directive. 
This paper examines the factors that persuaded the German government 
to end its opposition to creating an energy regulator, and argues that this was 
mainly driven by the unsatisfactory evolution of the gas market, as well as the 
margin squeeze in electricity. The shift to regulated TPA raises questions on 
how network charges will be set and with what implications for network 
investment. The paper also investigates investment incentives in generation in 
the light of concerns over security of supply post California and the impact of 
the EU Emission Trading Scheme that starts from January 2005. Forecast 
generation capacity looks adequate for supply security, although care should be 
taken. Support for renewables (especially wind) remain favourable, and a high 
carbon dioxide price and free CO2-emission rights for new plant encourages new 
investment in gas-fired plants. Although the margin squeeze facilitated by 
vertical integration and the lack of network regulation discouraged new entry, 
the new regulatory framework should be expected to repair this flaw. Compared 
to the structural reforms elsewhere in the EU, the ability of the German ESI to 
exercise market power at the expense of the consumer continues to raise 
concerns, but the catalytic effect of a well-staffed regulator scrutinising access 
charges represents a considerable improvement on the recent past. 
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2. THE LONG ROAD TO REGULATION 
2.1 Key institutional steps 
 
The liberalisation of the German ESI started in 1998 with the Energy 
Act that implemented the EU Electricity Directive of 1996. Three main features 
determined the resulting institutional framework. First, it mandated immediate 
and full customer liberalisation, so that all end-users could choose their retailer. 
However, it took until late 1999 before this became a reality. Second, it did not 
restrict vertical integration, which was prevalent and increasing in the German 
ESI. Only the minimal EU requirements on unbundling were implemented, but 
as they were rapidly shown to be ineffectively controlled, these requirements 
were meaningless in practice. Third, the Act opted for negotiated Third Party 
Access (nTPA) to the network, in contrast to the rest of Europe.5 
While regulated TPA requires a regulator authorised to approve 
network charges ex ante, the German legislator relied on a negotiated 
arrangement of network access within the sector, while ex post  control of 
possible abuse was left to the Cartel Office. The Competition Act, from which 
the Cartel Office derives authorisation, was strengthened with an essential 
facilities doctrine, which states that access to the networks should be given to 
third parties on non-discriminatory terms and against fair and reasonable 
charges. The latter part was the source of (ex-post) control of the network access 
charges. A general framework for the conditions of network access for third 
parties had to be negotiated by the sector associations. 
The resulting association agreement (VV) 6 for network access is after 
VVI and VVII currently in its third version, VVII+. The first association 
agreement relied on a distance-related contract-path principle, which apart from 
ignoring the laws of physics, was deemed anti-competitive. In December 1999, 
VVI was replaced by VVII, which introduced postage stamps for network 
access. The structure and other conditions of network access in VVII were quite 
good, although some of the details could be criticised. The aim of the Energy 
Act was to leave the determination of the level of the network access charges to 
the network operators, and therein lay its main problem. Formally, the Cartel 
Office was authorised to control the level of the access charges, but the Cartel 
                                                                                                         
directive 96/92/EC, 26 June 2003. O.J. L176/37.  
5 Italy and Portugal opted for the single buyer model for the franchise market but all other countries 
adopted regulated TPA for internal trade. 
 4
Office lacked the necessary means, and the Competition Act was too weak to 
effectively enforce lower charges. 
Meanwhile the sector became ever more concentrated, both vertically 
and horizontally. In general terms, the German ESI consisted of two different 
types of firms. On the one hand, a small number of so-called 
Verbundunternehmen  owned and operated the High Voltage (HV) network and 
the generation plants in the associated control area. On the other hand, about 900 
mainly municipality-owned distribution companies held franchises for both the 
distribution network and the local retail or supply businesses. The 
Verbundunternehmen have been quite active in taking over distributors, thereby 
integrating downstream, as well as merging among themselves. 
Table 1 reveals that the concentration in generation increased slowly 
since the early 1990’s but rather steeply around 2000/01. A first event was the 
direct consequence of the re-unification. The sale of the former East-German 
producer VEAG to the West German Verbundunternehmen was formally 
concluded in 1996. RWE, VEBA and VIAG each held 25% of the shares and the 
remaining 25% were divided over the other western Verbundunternehmen. As 
all data in table 1 reflect cross-participation rates, the sale of VEAG has been 
taken into account in the table 1 in the A columns; the B columns compare by 
taking out VEAG. In 1996, two relatively small firms, EVS and Badenwerk, 
merged to EnBW. The main merger wave occurred around 2000/01, when RWE 
merged with VEW to RWE and VEBA and VIAG merged to E.On. In this 
process, the firms were required to sell the shares they held in VEAG; it was 
agreed that the sole buyer, Vattenfall Europe, would merge former VEAG in the 
same process with Berlin-based BEWAG and Hamburg-based HEW. The 
number of Verbundunternehmen was thereby reduced to four, which 
corresponds to the current state. Table 1 reflects these critical steps around 
2000/01 as pre -merger (again with A and B columns) and post-merger (without 
A and B distinction as the VEAG shares had to be sold). The process increased 
concentration steadily with a current Herfindahl index of about 2500. 
It is often heard that this is the market structure desired by the 
government: four firms striking a balance between competitive pressure while 
retaining sufficiently strong bargaining parties to face large gas suppliers in 
Russia, Norway and the Netherlands. Furthermore, competitive pressure from 
abroad is restricted by the interconnector constraints (and the interconnectors are 
owned by the vertically integrated companies). The interconnectors to the 
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Netherlands are used mainly for exports to the Netherlands and are typically 
export-constrained, whereas to Denmark they are heavily constrained in both 
directions. Two interconnectors are predominantly used for imports; first, from 
France, but EdF owns a big share in EnBW, and from the Czech Republic, 
which is heavily constrained. Lastly, the incumbents control large shares of the 
existing capacity. Further interconnector investment would be needed to allow 
imports to exert much competitive pressure. 
This structure may represent the energy policy desires of the legislator, 
but is of course quite unlikely to be good for competition. Allowing market 
concentration to become this high must be considered a missed opportunity.  
 
Table 1 Market shares in generation 
Percentages of output 
 1994 A 1994 B 2000 
Pre A 
2000 
Pre B 
2000 Post 
VEBA 16.92 13.96 21.36 18.77 
VIAG 
} E.ON 
11.23 8.27 12.55 9.97 
} 28.74 
RWE 31.38 28.42 31.53 28.94 
VEW  } RWE 7.24 6.65 8.84 8.33 } 37.27 
EVS 4.89 4.30 
Badenwerk } EnBW 4.91 4.32 } 9.64 } 8.60 } 8.60 
HEW 3.55 2.96 3.09 2.57 
BEW A G 2.87 2.28 2.65 2.13 
VEAG 
} 
V’FALL 
- 11.84 - 10.33 
} 15.03 
Other 17.00 17.00 10.35 10.35 10.35 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
HHI 1807 1595 1903 1658 2622 
Source: Drasdo et.al. (1998), Bergman et.al. (1999, p. 149) and Brunekreeft 
(2003, p.207) 
Note: The shares have been corrected for participation rates. Pre means Pre-
merger and Post means Post-merger. V’Fall is Vattenfall 
 
A strongly criticized merger occurred in 2002, when E.On merged with 
Ruhrgas. E.On is predominantly electricity-based, while Ruhrgas is 
predomin antly a gas importer and transporter and highly dominant on the 
German market. Because access to gas is increasingly critical to competition in 
electricity generation, the Cartel Office prohibited the merger, since it would 
substantially lessen competition in electricity. Again having other aims, the 
Minister of Economic Affairs overruled the Cartel Office as well as his own 
advisors in the Monopolies Commission and approved the merger. 
Whereas the authorities have given the public impression that the 
various changes had worked well, official confirmation that the institutional 
                                                                                                         
separate association agreements.  
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framework was unsatisfactory came with a review of network access by the 
Cartel Office in April 2001 (Bundeskartellamt, 2001). The review levelled two 
main criticisms. First and most important, access charges were (too) high. The 
VVII lays down a set of accounting principles for calculating the network 
charges, which are discussed below. In principle, this facilitates ex post control 
of the charges. After exploring the legal possibilities of the Competition Act, the 
Cartel Office claimed that its powers were severely constrained. In particular, it 
concluded that the Competition Act did not allow ex ante price-cap regulation, 
because the Competition Act can only be applied after justified suspicion of 
abuse, which is  ex post by definition. Moreover, the Cartel Office expressed a 
preference for price benchmarking as an indicator of abuse of market power, but 
notes practical problems in its application. The price level may be too high 
overall, in which case comparison of different firms is inconclusive. 
Alternatively, firms can be compared with comparators abroad, but the Cartel 
Office notes that it does not have authority to collect information from firms 
abroad and would have to rely on (public) work of the regulators abroad. 
Benchmarking requires that firms are only compared with comparable firms, 
implying that structural differences beyond control of the firm should be taken 
into account, which requires rather detailed information. 
In the review the Cartel Office also discusses a number of practices of 
genuine discrimination of third parties (also known as raising rivals’ costs or 
sabotage), but concludes  that after settling the principle cases of doubt, it was to 
be expected that the network operators would not unduly discriminate against 
third parties (Bundeskartellamt, 2001, p. 70).  
The highly critical review by the Cartel Office was followed by the 
VVII+ replacing the VVII. The structure of network access was modified only 
slightly; the main innovation of VVII+ was to introduce industrial self-
regulation. VVII+ requires network operators to publish the network charges 
according to predefined consumer profiles as described below. The primary aim 
of this appears to be to assist the Cartel Office, but it can also be argued that the 
sector attempted to internalise free-riding behaviour of smaller network 
operators, who might have felt less restrained in abusing their local market 
power and who might have thereby undermined the case for self-regulation 
(Brunekreeft, 2003, 2004). Over the course of the last two years, the network 
access charges at LV levels fell modestly, while the HV charges increased 
slightly. 
The result of this institutional framework is what can be described as a 
margin squeeze. In other words, the profit margins in generation and retail are 
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low. Müller & Wienken (2004) estimate that roughly 40% of the household 
market is effectively closed, because the margin is below cost. The cumulative 
switching rates are very low, with less than 5% for households and slightly more 
than 6% for commercial customers ever having switched. Several initially 
successful retailers went bankrupt and by 2004 only Yello, which is a subsidiary 
of EnBW, survived and it was struggling, despite having one million customers. 
The same picture emerges at the wholesale market. Figure 1 suggests that the 
wholesale power prices at the spot market EEX have been very low (at least in 
comparison with the (gas-based) thermal system in The Netherlands and with 
new entry prices), although they appear to be increasing recently. On the one 
hand, this could be the result of excess capacity, while on the other hand, high 
concentration ratios would suggest that the firms should have been able to keep 
prices reasonably high (as in Britain), unless they were keeping the competitive 
wholesale price low and enjoying profits in the transmission part of their 
vertically integrated structure. 
 
Figure 1: German and Dutch wholesale power prices (28-day centred 
moving averages) 
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Source: EEX and APX web sites 
 
The picture is consistent with theoretical explanation. As has been 
argued elsewhere (Brunekreeft, 2002),7 the vertical integration of competitive 
and unregulated monopolistic businesses provides an incentive to secure profits 
                                                
7 In the context of telecommunications, compare also Beard et al. (2001) and Mandy (2000). 
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in the natural monopoly (wires) businesses and set low margins at the 
competitive stages. The result is a violation of the level playing field, as the low 
margins frustrate the development of active competition and new entry. Note 
that the poor situation for the entrants is not the result of discrimination of third 
parties. As Beard et. al. (2001, p. 328) nicely put it: “sabotage is solely a 
phenomenon associated with regulation.” This implies that regulation of the 
network charges will shift attention of the vertically integrated firms to the 
competitive businesses and thereby increase the margins and  intensify the 
incentives to discriminate against third parties. The price increase announced in 
September 2004 is telling. The announcements mainly concern end-user prices 
whereas changes in network charges are yet unclear, but can at least be expected 
to be under pressure as soon as the regulator picks up its task. Hence, an 
increase in the margins can already be observed. 
What is perhaps surprising is that there appeared to be an outbreak of 
retail competition and a significant drop in end-user prices shortly after the 
VVII. The end-user prices increased slowly but steadily since then and a very 
substantial increase has been announced by the big firms in September 2004. 
After the introduction of VVII, new retailers and more prominently, new retail 
departments of the big four Verbundunternehmen entered the retail market on a 
large scale with low prices (cf. e.g. Brunekreeft, 2003, p. 220).8 This rather 
surpris ing development requires an explanation. One explanation might be that 
the incumbents depressed the price levels to lower the acquisition value of 
possible take-over targets.9 The argument is appealing but may not entirely 
apply here. As indicated above, take-over and merger activity has been modest 
until the big 2000/01 mergers. Many distributors/retailers were taken over from 
mid-1990’s, while the price decrease started mid -1999. Moreover, the price 
decrease may have squeezed the retail margin, but the network charges were still 
high. Further, the sharp increase in generation concentration in 2000/01 
predominantly concerned (horizontal, relatively symmetrical) mergers rather 
than take -overs. An alternative explanation comes from the perceived regulatory 
threat induced in particular by the notable absence of a regulator, in sharp 
contrast to all neighbouring countries; the industry was under severe pressure to 
show that self-regulation could work (cf. Brunekreeft, 2004). The announcement 
of the price increas es in September 2004 is then unsurprising; because the 
                                                
8 In the subsequent period many of the low-priced entrants either went bankrupt or increased their 
prices. Since the average retail price level is the calculated average of a selection of best-practice 
prices, this process increased the average price level.  
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installation of a regulator is now a fact, there is no longer a need to try to hold it 
off.  
The flaws of negotiated TPA have been documented by a report of the 
Monopolies Commission (Monopolkommission, 2003) and shortly after that by 
the so-called Monitoring Report  of the Ministry of Economic Affairs (BMWA, 
2003), which then paved the way to accepting the EU Directive’s provision 
requiring regulated TPA. The new institutional framework will be laid down in a 
modified Energy Act 2004, which is expected to enter into force in the course of 
2004. 
 
2.2. WINGAS 
The experiences with negotiated TPA in the ESI would convince most 
economists of the desirability of regulation, but it is questionable whether they 
have been sufficient to convince the politicians. The key political development 
undermining negotiated TPA and shifting support towards regulation was the 
failure of negotiated TPA in the gas market. The Monitoring Report (BMWA, 
2003, p. 42) suggests three problems with the gas VVII. First, it argued that the 
contract-path approach for the network usage impeded competition. Second, 
there was a lack of transparency on network capacities and storage facilities that 
hindered effective negotiation. Third, high charges for balancing services 
impeded competitive entry. The first point may seem self-evident (and is 
certainly valid for electricity networks), but is in fact not obviously important. 
For an electricity network, a contract-path model is an inefficient pricing method 
because electricity flows over all paths between the source and sink, and cannot 
be attributed to a specific contract path. Gas in contrast can (and must) be 
controlled to flow over specific routes to remain within the pressure parameters 
of the pipelines and compressors. Second, because most gas is imported, it is not 
clear why distance dependent charges would discriminate against third parties. 
Nevertheless, an entry-exit model would improve the position of third parties 
without obvious disadvantages. 
Because the Energy Act concerns both electricity and gas, 
developments in the gas sector triggered changes in the ESI as well. The 
question to be answered is why the experiences in the ESI were modestly 
successful, while the same institutional framework failed in the gas sector? 
Negotiated TPA means an obligation for the relevant associations to negotiate a 
collective framework for access. Co-producers and large industrial energy users 
                                                                                                         
9 The authors would like to thank David Newbery for pointing out the argument. In a more general 
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are represented by the association VIK (in both the electricity and the gas 
negotiations). VIK agreed and adopted the association agreement VV 
(electricity), but broke off the negotiations for VV (gas).  
The German GSI relies strongly on gas imports. Over 80% of gas 
consumed is imported.10 Trading, imports and the network are heavily 
dominated by Ruhrgas, which has a share in imports of approximately 75%. The 
long-distance network is in five hands. Three firms (BEB, VNG and 
Thyssengas) cover relatively small areas, while by far the largest area is covered 
by Ruhrgas. The network areas of these four are neatly demarcated and hardly 
overlap. The interesting case is the fifth firm: Wingas, which is a joint venture 
between the chemicals manufacturer BASF (65%) and the Russian gas provider 
Gazprom (35%). Wingas is active on the wholesale market but also builds and 
operates (long distance) pipelines in Germany. Since 1992, Wingas has built 
four pipelines and plans further expansion. These pipelines are partly parallel to 
Ruhrgas pipelines, with capacities ranging from 10 bcm to 24 bcm and a total 
length of over 2,000 km. 
Wingas makes the key difference between the gas and electricity 
sectors. The primary aim of Wingas was a direct contract between Gazprom as a 
gas supplier and BASF as a large gas user, excluding any interference from 
Ruhrgas. This kind of competition also happens in electricity. However, in 
electricity the largely vertically integrated utilities which lose customers in the 
competitive businesses can fall back on their networks which cannot be by-
passed.11 In contrast, Wingas builds its own pipelines, partly parallel to the 
pipelines of Ruhrgas and thereby partly by-passing Ruhrgas’ network. Thus, in 
contrast to electricity, where wholesale competition is not a threat to the 
monopoly networks, gas competition allows the development and network roll-
out of competition in long-distance gas networks to at least some extent (cf. 
Knieps, 2002). It is unlikely that this will make the long-distance gas transport 
market competitive, but it may be a sufficiently strong threat to Ruhrgas to tip 
the balance in the negotiations over the association agreement. 
                                                                                                         
context, this type of argument has been examined in Burns (1986) and Saloner (1987). 
10 31% from Russia, 19% from the Netherlands, 25% from Norway and 7% from the UK and 
Denmark. (Cf. website of BGW). The home production of gas is concentrated with a share of over 
85% in three hands. 
11 Although there is restricted by-pass potential by co-generators, by-pass by building direct lines in 
competition to existing lines is extremely rare.  
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The argument is reminiscent of the general idea behind the essential-
facilities doctrine.12 The essential-facilities doctrine should not be applied, if it 
can be expected that an entrant could profitably invest in the facility itself 
without reducing overall welfare. In that case difficult access and relatively high 
access charges facilitate investment. The same line of argument applies for the 
incumbent firm; if Ruhrgas sets  high network charges, it will invite further 
network roll-out by Wingas. Ruhrgas will thus have a reason to lower the 
network charges and consequently shift its attention to earning higher profit 
margins in trading activities. This in turn, however, would invite new entrants 
into the trading business and further development of the customer base of 
Wingas. Hence, Ruhrgas appears to have a straightforward reason to foreclose 
the trading activities by “sabotaging” network access. 
The argument can stop here as  it suggests an incentive to set relatively 
low network charges and in return foreclose the competitive market with third-
party discrimination. This applies perfectly well to “fourth parties” (i.e. 
competitors in the competitive activities other than Wingas who do not own a 
network). With regard to Wingas the argument is slightly more refined, as 
Wingas would profit from the high trading margins as well. Given, however, the 
fringe position of Wingas’ network it seems reasonable to assume that Wingas’ 
customers will have to rely to at least some extent on the Ruhrgas network. 
Hence, third-party discrimination will likely harm Wingas customers and 
thereby lower the profit margin for Wingas. Assuming that it is unreasonable to 
assume that Wingas would duplicate the entire network of Ruhrgas, the 
incentives for Wingas to invest diminish. 
The association agreements were negotiated by a number of industry 
associations, one of which was VIK, representing large energy users (and co-
producers). In the electricity negotiations, VIK is a user of the network. In gas, 
VIK represents one of its more important members BASF, which is not only a 
network user, but also network competitor.13 
 
                                                
12 And the discussion around local loop unbundling in telecommunications (cf. Gabelmann, 2002, 
and the references quoted therein). 
13 Meran & Hirschhausen (2004) offer an explanation of the failure of the gas negotiations relying on 
the argument that third-party competition threatens the dominant positions of the gas suppliers 
(BGW) and industrial users (VIK). Glachant et.al. (2004) explain the absence of a regulator from a 
political impasse but stress the pro-competitive dynamics of the presence of the Cartel Office 
(pushing the VVs towards stronger competition). It is not explained though why the pro-competitive 
dynamics of the Cartel Office did not apply to the GSI. 
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3. REGULATING THE NETWORK 
3.1 Cost-based or price-based regulation? 
 
As mentioned above, the regulation of the network access charges was 
minimal. Negotiated TPA meant that the industry associations negotiated a 
general access framework covering an outline of the structure of the charges and 
a method to calculate the charges. The precise determination of the level of the 
charges was left to the individual network operators. Control of the abuse of 
market power was handed over to the Cartel Office, which was strengthened for 
this task with an essential facilities doctrine (clause 19.4.4) in the competition 
law. The clause states that access to the network should be given on non-
discriminatory terms and with fair and reasonable charges. 
In the review of network access of April 2001, the Cartel Office 
(Bundeskartellamt, 2001) examined the problems  and prospects of applying 
competition law to the (excessive) network charges. First, it noted that its 
control must necessarily be ex post. Applying the competition law and 
subsequently starting an investigation requires a justified suspicion of an abuse 
of market power. Second, it explores in some detail the methods to exercise 
control in the event that charges were found to be excessive, in particular cost-
control and price benchmarking. The Cartel Office expresses a preference for 
the price benchmark, although this runs into an obvious information problem. 
The benchmark would compare a high-priced firm with a comparable low-
priced firm. Since the low-priced comparator does not abuse its market power 
by assumption, the Cartel Office cannot require the company to provide 
information. Although, as described below, the VVII+ helps in this respect, it is 
nevertheless believed that the Cartel Office was powerless and the network 
charges were excessively high (cf. for instance Monopolkommission, 2003; 
BMWA 2003; and Canty, 2003). 
Following this report of the Cartel Office, the ESI published VVII+, 
which entered into force in 2002. VVII+ strengthened the concept of industrial 
self-regulation in two respects, both in annex 3. First, VVII+ outlined the 
accounting principles to calculate the level of network charges. Second, the 
VVII+ assisted the Cartel Office by prescribing rules for transparent and 
harmonised publication of network charges, implicitly allowing the price 
benchmark as favoured by the Cartel Office. It required the distribution network 
operators to publish network charges calculated for given consumer profiles. In 
order to allow a proper benchmark in which firms are compared with 
comparable firms, the network operators have been classified into different 
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groups controlling for the following structural parameters: east/west, consumer 
density and the share of overhead lines. The idea was that network operators 
with charges in the top 30% of their class could be asked to justify the high level 
before an industrial arbitrator. In other words, if a high-priced network is not 
able to justify the high level it will find itself in the spotlights of the Cartel 
Office. Growitsch & Wein (2004) observe that this reduced the spread in 
network charges.  
The new Energy Act 2004 intends to apply the principles laid down in 
annex 3 of the VVII+ as the base for its regulation. As mentioned above, the 
choice between cost-based versus incentive-based is still out. In either case we 
may expect that the accounting principles of VVII+ will be applied: 
· depreciation is linear 
· capital life duration has been specified in detail 
· the underlying asset valuation method is written-down replacement value 
(for equity financed capital) 
· the ratio of equity over total capital has been restricted to 40% 
· the allowed real rate of return on equity has been set on 6.5%; this is post 
trade-tax, while pre corporate-income -tax. There is discussion to apply the 
principles of a CAPM approach.14 
These principles applied before the new Energy Act, but were not 
effectively enforced. Canty (2003) describes the experiences of the Cartel Office 
and criticises the application of the principles on several counts with the 
implication that the rules were simply not effective. 
 Asset valuation relied on replacement values but depreciation did not. 
According to the rules, depreciation is determined at the start of the accounting 
year, while replacement value is determined at the end of the accounting year. 
Thus if the replacement value goes up and depreciation value is not (fully) 
adjusted both the cost including depreciation and the allowed return (at 6.5%) on 
equity are high. Either the Regulatory Asset Base (RAB) should be written 
down by the allowed depreciation (and incremented by investment) or 
depreciation should be calculated as the change in value of the original assets 
(excluding new investment). 
Canty also criticises the allocation of an excessive fraction of common 
costs to the electricity network, creating higher network costs, which can be 
recouped through higher charges. This is a difficult issue. In as far as it concerns 
non-genuine common costs, the criticism is intuitive and to be taken seriously. 
                                                
14 The corporate income tax is 25%, while the trade tax varies by region. 
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However, the nature of common costs implies that there is no simple cost-
related method of allocation these costs. It is not clear how the common costs 
should be allocated to various parts of the business. If network demand were 
thought to be more inelastic than demand for the services supplied over the 
network, such an allocation could be justified on efficiency grounds, but this 
Ramsey argument would be hard to defend as the services are jointly supplied 
with the network. The fact that in many countries the network is under separate 
ownership from the competitive activities suggests that the extent of common 
costs in the vertically related electricity businesses (between the networks and 
the competitive businesses) is low. 
 Furthermore, Canty notes the practice that over-recovery of costs is not 
passed on to consumers (or otherwise recharged). The allowed rate of return is 
translated into an allowed revenue based on output estimated at the beginning of 
the accounting year, which in turn results in allowed prices. If realised output is 
higher, there will be an over-recovery and the rate of return will exceed that 
allowed. Current practice is to ignore this. 
Since the VVII+ will serve as the base for the new regulation, the 
question arises how this specific practice will be adjusted. If there is no change 
and ex-post difference (beyond a reasonable level of doubt) is not refunded to 
consumers, regulation will simply be non-binding. If, however, excess revenues 
must be refunded, two different options are available. On the one hand, the base 
for refunding may be the allowed rate of return. If the government sticks to ex-
post control this procedure establishes a consequent rate-of-return regulation. On 
the other hand, the base may be allowed revenues, which appears to approximate 
current practice in as far as it exists at all. This seems to be the more practical 
option and has similarities with price-cap regulation. Standard price-cap 
regulation sets the initial price to cover costs including a reasonable rate of 
return on the regulatory asset base (RAB) and rolls this forward allowing for 
investment, depreciation and predicted productivity growth. The distinguishing 
features are that the (indexed) price formula is specified ex ante and remains 
valid for a reasonably long time: the control period. Presumably the control 
period for the German ESI would be one year, which is short. But if the Ministry 
of Economics is serious about changing the system to “incentive regulation”, the 
required changes might actually be a mere shift in emphasis. In this case, all that 
would be needed to shift towards effective incentive-based regulation would be 
to extend the length of the control period during which the regulator commits to 
refrain from adjusting the price formula. 
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Roughly speaking one might say that incentive-based regulation is good 
for efficiency, while cost-based regulation is good for investment and thus 
network adequacy. Although data are scarce, the German ESI is said to be in a 
situation with relatively inefficient network operators but high supply security 
and high-capacity networks.15 If the modification to incentive-based regulation 
is a mere shift in emphasis rather than a radical break, there is a case for 
changing to incentive regulation as soon as possible. 
 
3.2. The design of balancing markets and the cost of balancing  
As elsewhere, the balancing market is critical and with consequences for 
competition and new entry. Each of the four control areas has its own balancing 
market.16 The current concerns are that the design allows strategic manipulation 
and that rather high balancing costs are passed through into the netwo rk charges. 
The present system was imposed by the Cartel Office in 2001 as part of the 
remedies in merger cases and replaces unsatisfactory previous arrangements. In 
all areas there are pay-as-bid auctions; the long term auction for capacity and 
short term auction for energy are separate. Availability of balancing capacity is 
compensated by a capacity price, while in addition, actual usage of the balancing 
capacity is compensated with an energy price. While the costs for the capacity 
payment is passed through to the network charges, the costs for (or revenue 
from) the energy prices is settled with a single balancing price.17 Except in the 
E.On area, this is calculated ex post as the weighted average of the auction bids 
(MGAP); in the E.On area, the balancing price corresponds to the marginal 
bid.18 Although this is the preferred model in well-functioning, liquid and 
competitive markets, it appears to be flawed in the German case. There appear 
to be two different problems currently.  
 The first problem is that the system is vulnerable to strategic 
manipulation. The reason is strategic behaviour of the market parties. If for 
instance the MGAP is expected to be high relative to the day -ahead price (e.g. 
EEX), generators want to be long. Although the system reinforces itself, because 
the MGAP will decrease if all generators are long, the incentive for market 
                                                
15 It should be noted though that the networks are relatively old and require replacement investment 
and updating in due time. 
16 Managed by the net work operators of RWE, E.On, EnBW and Vattenfall Europe. 
17 Cf. Ritzau (2003). It should be noted that the change enforced by the Cartel Office was a response 
to the previous two -priced system (cf. NERA, 2000).  
18 Mittlerer Gewichteter Arbeitspreis. Below we will argue with MGAP but the reasoning applies to 
the marginal bid as in the E.On area as well. 
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parties to speculate on the balancing price may be undesirable as it destabilises 
the system. 
 The second problem is that market power is said to keep bids and prices 
relatively high. The issue is far from straightforward and needs more research as 
it depends critically on details. We know that the integrated incumbents are 
dominant in their control areas, especially on the balancing markets. They can 
exercise market power if they like. However, the incentives are not clear. First, 
arbitrage with the spot market matters and can correct perverse incentives. This 
applies for the energy prices and not for capacity prices. It is interesting to note 
that the capacity price (for non primary reserve) in the RWE area stopped 
decreasing at the moment the E.On market was implemented in July 2002. This 
event reduced liquidity on the RWE market. Second, it is not straightforward 
how the integrated firms gain form exploiting market power. The generation 
business of the firm could profit from high prices, but the TSO department 
would have to pay for this. The energy prices are passed through to the MGAP, 
which is partly paid by third parties. The capacity prices are passed through into 
the network charges. The high balancing costs can so be used as a justification 
for higher network charges. 
Illiquidity in the balancing markets (combined with and partly created 
by market power) can lead to significant differences between the day-ahead and 
balancing prices. The balancing price follows the day-ahead price roughly, but 
not perfectly. One contributory problem is that the control areas are separated. 
Although generators from one control area are allowed to participate in the 
auctions of other control areas, this does not work well. The basically technical 
requirements to participate for generators outside the control area are said to be 
high, which works to the advantage of the incumbent with generators 
predominantly inside the control area. Presumably, further (regulatory) steps 
towards integration of the control areas are required. Already the RWE control 
centre is the main control centre in Germany, so it might form a natural hub for 
an independent system operator (ISO). 
 
3.3. REGTP 
Will the regulator be credible and will regulation become effective? There are 
reasons to be optimistic. Regulation as been placed in the hands of the Regulator 
for Telecommunications and Postal Services which has rather more than five 
year’s experience and a reputation for toughness. It will have more authority to 
gather information, a key problem for the Cartel Office, and the regulator’s 
decisions will be effective until overruled by a court. If legally challenged, 
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decisions taken by the Cartel Office did not come into operation until confirmed 
by a court: this, of course, could take several years.19 Finally, the regulator for 
energy has an initial budget for 60 employees which, with over 800 network 
operators and ex-post cost-based control, may well be necessary. Presumably, 
the new office will have self-enforcing dynamics: 60 newly hired employees 
will want something to do. A newly created bureaucracy can be expected to be a 
new pressure group in the political process and will want to gain in importance, 
so even if the first round of regulation is soft, an irreversible process may have 
been started. Opinions on the political independence of the REGTP differ. The 
fact that REGTP belongs to, but is at arm’s length from the Ministry of 
Economics is not the best guarantee for independence. On the other hand and in 
contract to telecommunications, the federal Ministry has no ownership interests 
in the energy sector. 
What can be expected if regulation of network charges takes effect? 
First, of course, network charges will fall, partly squeezing out excessive profits 
but, in time, as a result of increased efficiency. Secondly, as network profits 
decline, integrated firms will shift their attention away from the network towards 
the competitive businesses (generation and retail). This will have follow-on 
effects as it will restore the level playing field between integrated firms and third 
parties. To make profits in these competitive businesses requires a sufficiently 
large profit margin, predominantly under the control of the integrated firms, so 
the currently very low margins in generation and retail (see above) will rise. 
These increased margins (retail and EEX prices) will open up profitable entry 
opportunities in both generation and retail. In other words, where new entry with 
gas -fired CCGT was a hazardous enterprise, it may now be merely a normally 
risky project. This has the desirable side effect of mitigating the problem of low 
investment and supply security. To the extent that regulation of network charges 
implicitly or explicitly rely on the rate-or-return type, investment incentives in 
the monopolistic part are also retained. Lastly, as the threat of competition from 
third parties increases, the integrated firms will have a stronger tendency to 
(non-price) discriminate against third parties through discriminatory use of the 
network. Hence, vertical integration will be an increased problem and proposals 
for further vertical separation (and its enforcement) and ring-fencing should be 
recommended and expected.20  
 
                                                
19 This is not new in the Energy Act proposal as this shortcoming had been repaired in 2003 already. 
20 If, as suggested by the Energy Act, serious vertical unbundling of retail and the distribution 
network will wait until 2007, the prospects for Yello and other third-party retailers are bleak. 
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4. NEW ENTRY AND SUPPLY SECURITY 
4.1. Capacity 
 
Long-run capacity developments receive attention for two reasons, namely, 
security of supply and market power. The 2000/01 black-out in California and 
power shortages in Europe in the Summer of 2003 raised awareness of the high 
political costs of power black-outs. Moreover, capacity shortages increase the 
scope for exploiting market power. Competitive pressure depends, to a large 
extent, on the ratio of capacity to (peak) demand, and short -run Cournot-type 
competition relying on capacity withholding, loses credibility when faced with 
excess capacity. In other words, the firms can avoid severe short-run price 
competition by reducing available capacity. The importance of the capacity-to-
demand ratio has already been recognised for electricity spot markets (CAISO, 
2000, pp.50 ff.); if capacity becomes scarce, spot prices can rise quickly and to 
extreme levels. In the longer run, spot prices will serve as a signal to both 
incumbents and third parties to bring mothballed and new capacity into 
operation. 
 The combination of the traditional model of cost-based regulation, 
incentives to invest in new capital and an obligation to guarantee a reasonable 
supply security, created severe excess generation capacity in the German ESI 
(summarised in figure 2).21  
 
Figure 2: Excess generation capacity 
Sources: own calculations, Markewitz & Vögele (2001); VDN 
(Leistungsbilanz); UCTE 2003, 2004. 
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capacity, non-available capacity (N.A. capacity) and, as the calculated residual, 
remaining (or free) capacity. The share of planned reserve capacity, which is 
primarily determined by reliability rules (like n-1), fell recently to 
approximately 11%, still relatively high. The planned reserve ratio fell as a 
result of a policy change: the time between revisions was increased while the 
duration of revisions was shortened, which implies that less capacity is under 
revision and thus less reserve capacity is required. There seems to be sufficient 
reserve capacity to cope with some unplanned scarcity. The ratio of 11 % is still 
above UCTE average. The category N.A. (or, non-usable) capacity covers both 
“unreliable” renewable (wind)22 and mothballed capacity. Data for the UK 
collected by Ofgem (JESS, 2003, p. 13) examined the time taken to bring 3.7 
GW mothballed capacity into operation: 1.3GW required 0-3 months, 0.3GW 
required 3-6 months, 1.0GW required 6-12 months and 1.1GW required 12-24 
months. These numbers suggest that while some mothballed capacity can be 
returned to service reasonably quickly, as time goes by mothballed capacity 
deteriorates and takes longer to restore. 
Wind capacity increasingly becomes a problem. Wind power depends 
on the unreliable availability of wind, but as long as the proportion of wind 
power is small, it does not really matter whether it is considered to be available 
or non-available capacity. But with increasing shares of wind power, it does 
matter. Presumably, working from experience, load factors to calculate 
probabilities may help to determine the amount that is available with a certain 
loss of load probability. The figure clearly suggests that this may be the main 
capacity problem as suggested as well by the UCTE forecast report (UCTE, 
2003, p. 13). The category N.A. capacity thus contains capacity which is either 
available with some defined probability, or can be made available within a 
reasonable time, and so amounts to excess capacity. The remaining category is 
free capacity, which as the name suggests, is genuine excess capacity. 
The steep decrease in 2000 is interesting. On the one hand the data 
should be interpreted with caution. VDN demand data increase sharply while at 
the same time capacity falls sharply, with the calculated consequence that the 
remaining capacity falls. These developments are not confirmed by UCTE. On 
the other hand there have been capacity changes. Following low wholesale 
power prices, E.On and RW E announced closure of 4.5 and 5.0GW generation 
capacity respectively (cf. Markewitz & Vögele, 2001, pp. 21 ff.) and thereby 
reduced excess capacity. The RWE closure includes the closure of the nuclear 
                                                                                                         
21 See for more details, Brunekreeft & Twelemann (2004). 
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plant Mühlheim-Kärlich (1.2GW capacity). The capacity effect of its closure is 
very limited and may actually be positive. The plant had been switched off in 
1988 because of a re -assessed risk of potential earthquakes, while being part of 
the nuclear phase out, negotiation with the government led to other nuclear 
plants producing more as compensation. RWE’s plant closure also included old 
gas and coal plants. Because RWE had 3GW new capacity (mainly coal) under 
construction, the effective capacity reduction was 2GW. E.On reduced capacity 
by 4.58GW, of which 1.33GW was mothballed. With newly constructed plant of 
0.8GW, the effective capacity reduction was 2.4GW. The sum of E.ON’s and 
RWE’s capacity reduction is 4.4GW. Mothballing plant which does not recover 
variable costs is a sensible strategy and also has the strategic side effect of 
demonstrating a credible commitment to refraining from the use of (excess) 
capacity on the spot market. Hence, mothballing capacity stabilises Cournot-like 
competition. Although this raises some concern about market abuse, 
mothball ing does not necessarily inhibit security of supply, because the capacity 
should be available quite quickly. 
A concern is the phasing out of 20 GW of nuclear assets over the next 
20 years. Figure 2 suggests that current installed capacity corrected for planned 
reserves would still serve peak load whilst allowing a significant part of the 
phasing out of nuclear power. The extent and speed of replacing the nuclear 
assets critically depends on the assessment of the availability of the non-
available capacity. UCTE forecast suggests that remaining capacity may be 
stable around 5 to 6 GW which is around 5% of installed capacity. Two factors 
complicate the assessment. First, many power plants are relatively old. Second, 
whether the nuclear phase out actually takes place or will be reversed by a next 
government is highly uncertain. Overall, although there is no urgent need for 
concern, it seems wise to monitor developments. 
 
4.2. New entry 
Post-liberalisation new entry into generation, other than renewables, has been 
disappointingly modest. The obvious candidate is gas -fuelled CCGT; four major 
projects are known, two of which (Fortum and Dynergy) failed (OECD, 2003, p. 
20/21). Not only were wholesale electricity prices very low, but a change in tax 
law added to the problem. Gas plants were exempted from paying the mineral 
oil tax but only for those on-stream before January 1st 2004, and for plant with a 
                                                                                                         
22 Approximately 90% of wind capacity is included in N.A. capacity. 
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fuel efficiency of over 57.5%.23 Further problems were caused by an increase in 
gas prices and problems in gas supply contracts. There is a gas spot market in 
Germany at Bunde (at the Dutch border), but liquidity is very low and 
dominated by Ruhrgas. Hence, for CCGT plants, supply contracts with Ruhrgas 
are difficult to by-pass. The merger between E.On and Ruhrgas mentioned 
above, presumably worsened the situation substantially. The only significant 
project currently under construction is Concord Power (at Lubmin). Concord 
Power is a 1200 MW plant, owned 50% by EnBW and 25% by E.On and can 
thus not be considered a third party. A fourth merchant project is an 800 MW 
gas turbine near Aachen developed by Trianel, which collects participants from 
especially the distributors/suppliers. The project is in fund-raising stage.  
Further new entry should be expected from renewable energies. The 
renewable energy act (EEG) combines a technology-dependent feed-in tariff and 
a take-off obligation on the network operators to whose network the renewable 
is connected. The feed-in charges, for which the costs are socialised over the 
network customers, are considered to be high and new renewable capacity, 
especially wind, is expanding significantly. The promotion of renewables is 
expected to add 15 GW capacity in the next 5 years.24 Currently, wind has a 
non-negligible output share of slightly below 5% which is expected to grow to 
9% in 2008. 
With the growth of renewables, controversy also grows. Industry 
observers suggest that the feed-in tariff for wind is still so high that new plant is 
built in highly unfavourable places. More importantly, as wind is unreliable, the 
demand for reserve capacity increases, raising the issue of who is responsible for 
this, and who will pay for it. Another controversy surrounds off-shore 
windfarms, albeit still in the planning stage, which would most likely be built in 
northern Germany in the Eastsee. Since the extreme north-eastern part of 
Germany is sparsely populated, the HV network running south is thin and would 
require substantial reinforcement. Again the question of payment arises. 
Currently, network upgrading is the responsibility of the network operators and 
costs are socialised over the associated network users. This may not be 
reasonable if the costs are high and specific to the wind power.  
Further controversy arises with the start of the European emission 
trading scheme (ETS) in 2005 (see below). If the emission of greenhouse gases 
(especially CO2) is a problem for the environment, then internalising emissions, 
                                                
23 In July 2004, this was reversed and exemption was extended to 2007 for fuel-efficient plant over 
57.5%.  
24 Calculated by authors using numbers from Pfaffenberger & Hille (2003, p. 5.9). 
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which is what the ETS does, is the correct approach. Subsidising renewables is 
an indirect approach because it promotes alternatives, thereby displacing 
harmful sources. But this method contains a higher risk of distortion than 
directly pricing the emission, and having two simultaneous approaches seems 
difficult to defend. The remaining argument for subsidising wind relies on 
learning effects: until the technology is mature, the development shows 
learning-by-doing and requires R&D, while the (non-internalised) spill-over 
effects of new inventions and innovations inefficiently reduces the incentives to 
invest in learning and R&D. Whereas the argument is theoretically valid, the 
empirical relevance is controversial and depends quite strongly on the specific 
technology and life cycle. In any case, the start of ETS reduces the necessity to 
subsidise wind and other renewables. Notwithstanding these arguments, there 
are no political signs that the system of feed-in tariffs might be changed in the 
near future. 
New entry will be promoted by regulating network charges. As argued 
in the section above, lack of regulation of network access charges and vertical 
integration created incentives for making profits from the network rather than 
from the competitive businesses. Despite high concentration in generation (see 
table 1) and retail, the margins were low, reducing incentives for new entry by 
third parties. This is about to change with the regulation of network access 
charges. Vertically integrated firms will shift the emphasis on securing profits 
towards the competitive businesses and away from the networks; concentration 
will start to matter and opportunities for new entry will increase. Thus, the new 
regulatory framework may lower network charges, but at the same time increase 
margins and, paradoxically, may increase end-user prices where the competitive 
stages are not sufficiently competitive.25 It is just this, however, that will offer 
new opportunities for entrants and thereby increase long-term competitiveness 
and improve supply security. 
 
4.3. ETS, NAP and new gas 
The generation mix in Germany relies heavily on coal and lignite (cf. table 2); 
figure 3 indicates that the share of gas is still small. With the implementation of 
the European emission trading scheme (ETS) in January 2005, CCGT may be in 
a more favourable position because gas emits less CO2 than coal. The ETS 
                                                
25 Although details differ, a similar phenomenon can be observed in New Zealand (cf. Brunekreeft, 
2003, p. 196). 
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results from the EU Directive of October 2003,26 and is currently in the process 
of being incorporated into national law in various member states who are 
required to publish National Allocation Plans (NAP). 
 
Table 2: Generation mix 2002 (in MW) 
 capacity in MW shares Generation 
TWh 
shares  
Nuclear 21,283 23% 156 32% 
Lignite 18,811 20% 143 29% 
Coal 24,882 27% 114 23% 
Gas 16,315 17% 36 7% 
Hydro & Wind 12,471 13% 45 9% 
Total 93,762 100% 494 100% 
Source: VDEW (2004) 
Note: The figures are net of German Railways  and co-generation.  
 
The ETS aims at introducing a system of tradable greenhouse gas 
emission rights, the most important of which is CO2. The degree of detail in the 
Directive is low with many details left to the decision of member states. This 
will result in different and possibly conflicting rules. A key aspect arranged by 
the CEC is the prime method of allocation of CO2 rights. Art. 10 of the Directive 
prescribes that for the period 2005 - 2007 at least 95% of all rights in each 
member state, and for the period 2008 - 2012 at least 90% must be allocated free 
of charge. It is left for the member states to decide how the remaining rights are 
allocated (i.e. free of charge or auctioned). Futures on CO2 rights are traded 
already. For instance, EVO27 was trading 2005 futures at a price of about €10/t 
CO2 in July 2004. These prices are considered to be very low due to high 
uncertainty and generous national allocations. 
Incorporation into German law and details of the allocation method are 
laid down in the National Allocation Plan for Germany (March 2004), for which 
the Ministry of Environment is responsible.28 Caps for the sector “Energy and 
Industry” are 503 Mt CO2/year for 2005-2007 and 495 Mt CO2/year 2008-2012, 
considered by industry observers to be generous. CO2 rights for existing plant 
will be allocated free of charge, basically relying on historical emission values. 
Although free allocation to existing plant sacrifices considerable public revenue, 
providing the allocation is not contingent on continuing operation or on the 
actual level of output, it need not be inefficient. It can be explained by a 
                                                
26 EU Directive 2003/87/EC, establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading; 
O.J. L 275/32, 25.10.2003. 
27 www.evomarkets.com/evoid. 
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stranded-cost argument.29 More problematic is free-of-charge allocation of rights 
to new plant. Possible inefficiencies associated with new investment can be 
severe, while the stranded -cost defence is not plausible. However, as will be 
argued below, as a by-effect, free allocation to new plant mimics a capacity 
element and thereby promotes new entry.30 
 
Figure 3: Development of the generation mix in Germany (production) 
 
Source: Pfaffenberger & Hille (2003, p. 3.1). 
 
For this allocation, the ZuG distinguishes between genuinely new plant 
and replacement of decommissioned old plant. For genuinely new plant, the free 
allocation relies on best available technology (BAT). This looks better than it is. 
The precise wording is: “The electricity benchmark is 750g carbon dioxide 
equivalent/kWh. This value is derived from the weighted average (...) of modern 
lignite, coal and gas -fired power plants.” However, “the allowances will not 
exceed actual requireme nt but will be at least 365g carbon dioxide 
equivalent/kWh.” (i.e. based on CCGT) (ZuG, 2004, p. 36). Because the upper 
limit of 750g is actually the emission of an efficient coal plant, this clause 
protects new coal. At the same time, allocating the rights for new gas based 
upon the coal benchmark seems excessively generous to new gas. As a result, 
                                                                                                         
28 With minor changes, the NAP passed parliament mid-July 2004 and is officially called 
Zuteilungsgesetz (ZuG). 
29 The system will work out differently for different plants and thereby firms. Allocation free of 
charge will create windfall profits overall and thereby soften these differences as probably all firms 
win.  
30 Note that we examine new entry for its competitive effect. For a detailed long-run study of 
replacement of old plant, especially in light of phasing out nuclear power, compare Peek et al. 
(2004).  
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the benchmark is reduced to own emission values with a minimum which 
corresponds to the emission value of new gas. For replacement of old plant, a 
transfer rule ensures that the rights allocated to the old plant can be carried over 
to the new plant. The transfer rule avoids delaying replacement of old plant by 
new clean plant, but it distorts the level playing field in favour of the 
incumbents. The fact that CO2 rights are allocated free of charges to new plant 
also implies that rights have to be kept in reserve. These have been set at 9 
Mt/year. If more than 9 Mt/year are needed, additional rights have to be 
provided by a government agency, which has to buy the rights on the market. In 
accordance with the EU Directive, banking from the first period (2005 - 2007) 
into the second period (2008 - 2012) is not allowed. The argument is that 
because the number of allowances in the first period is generous, carrying some 
over into the second period would make it more difficult to achieve the Kyoto 
benchmark. 
What are the implications for new gas entry into the market? A CO2 
emission price increases variable costs and since gas emits less than coal and 
lignite, the increase is lower for gas than for coal. The key effect of the CO2 
emission price is that if the CO2 price is high enough, gas has lower variable 
costs than either coal or lignite and this will reverse the merit order. In effect, 
the load factor of gas will increase substantially (and decrease for coal and 
lignite) which increases output of gas plants cet. par., in turn decreasing average 
fixed costs of gas plant and thus decreasing the entry price of new gas plant, at 
least relative to coal and lignite.31  
The (absolute) change in the entry price depends on a number of 
factors. The method of allocating the CO2 emission rights is the second key 
factor. In comparing free versus purchased allocation of rights to new plant, we 
will assume that the rights for existing plants are free. Note that even if the 
rights to new plant are free, the ETS has an effect as the CO2 price increases 
variable costs as an opportunity cost. However, as the rights are allocated freely 
they will be windfalls and, in effect, reduce fixed costs by the same amount. If 
the rights have to be bought, there is only the increase in variable costs (which 
will be partly or even fully offset by an increase in the electricity price induced 
by the increase in the opportunity cost of emissions). 
We compare the gas entry price with two polar cases: the variable costs 
of incumbent plant and a Cournot benchmark. In the first case it is assumed that 
                                                
31 We concentrate on gas only. Using an electricity market model, Peek et.al. (2004) suggest that 
with even moderate CO2 prices new investment to replace old plant will be gas plant. However, the 
calculations seem to presume that the firms pay for the rights, rather than receiving a free allocation.  
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existing plant, if pushed down the merit order by new gas, may lower prices to 
variable costs (including the CO2 emission price), irrespective of (sunk) capital 
costs (Bertrand competition). For new entry, assuming such strong price 
competition from existing plant is the most negative scenario, and may not be 
realistic. Existing plant is likely to determine the market price for other plant as 
well, implying that incumbent firms will have an incentive to keep up marginal 
prices, even if there is excess capacity. The margin of price above variable costs 
depends on the extent of competition which can be anything between pure price 
competition, limit -pricing to deter new entry and (tacit) collusion. What will 
happen is mere speculation; however, as Newbery (1995) noted for England and 
Wales, the former National Power and PowerGen duopoly seemed at some point 
to have chosen to maintain prices at or even above the entry level and accept or 
even encourage new entry. For Germany, it can be argued that high 
concentration and the reduction of excess capacity could allow some restriction 
of (short -run) competition. 
The other extreme is to examine the case of Cournot competition, and 
these two extremes should bound the range of plausible outcomes.32 
 
Table 3: Assumed plant costs and technical data. 
 Lignite Coal Gas (CCGT) 
Capacity (MW) 1000 600 800 
Load factor varies; see table A1 
Cost of plant (106 €) 1000 540 320 
Life time of plant (yrs) 40 40 35 
WACC (%) 7.1 7.1 7.1 
Staff (number of workers) 70 60 25 
Cost per worker/yr (€) 70,000 70,000 70,000 
Fixed operating costs (€/MWh) 
(=a(cost of plant/load)+ß) 
a: 0.0135 
ß: 0 
a: 0.015 
ß: 0 
a: 0.0175 
ß: 1.2 (€/MWh) 
Fuel efficiency 0.43 0.45 0.57 
Fuel cost (€/MWh) 
(not corrected for fuel efficiency) 
3.6 6 15 
CO2 emission (T/MWh) 
(corrected for fuel efficiency) 
0.92 0.75 0.35 
Source: in particular Pfaffenberger & Hille (2003, Annex 1). 
 
Table 3 summarises the characteristics for lignite, coal and gas 
underlying the calculations;33 the calculations have been simplified by ignoring 
 27
nuclear and wind, assuming that these are base load and independent of the CO2 
emission price. The load factors are determined by the merit order which 
depends on variable costs, which in turn are determined by the CO2 emission 
price. At critical values of the CO2 price, there are four discontinuous changes in 
the merit order, summarised in table A1 given in the appendix. These values 
have been calculated using the approximated load curve of 2002, with peak load 
of 75.8GW and minimum load of 38.0GW. The existing plant capacities (in 
MW) are as given in table 2. It has been assumed that fully used base-load 
capacity requires 15% reserve giving a maximum load factor of 85%. The most 
significant change is at a CO2 price of €31.50/tCO2, when gas shifts up the merit 
order to replace lignite.34 Coal displaces lignite at a CO2 price of €29.25 but, 
whereas this makes a difference for revenues of incumbent plant, it does not 
affect the gas entry price. It may be noted further that only gas and lignite are 
ever marginal. 
 
Figure 4: The entry price of new gas as a function of the price of CO2 
 
These preliminaries allow calculations of the gas entry price, both for 
the case of free-of-charge and paid allocation of CO2 emission rights to new 
                                                                                                         
32 The Cournot benchmark assumes four symmetrical firms and a market price elasticity of demand 
of -0.75. 
33 Unless stated otherwise, the numbers are taken from Pfaffenberger & Hille, (2003, esp. annex 1), 
and UBS (2003, p. 31). 
34 Pfaffenberger & Hille (2003, figure 8-27) derive a comparable price with respect to variable costs. 
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plant, under the two scenarios of Bertrand and Cournot competition, as a 
function of the CO2 price. These are depicted in figure 3, for which the key 
numbers are given in table A2 in the appendix. 
Figure 4 suggests the following. Assuming first the benchmark with 
strong price competition (Bertrand). With a gas price of about €15/MWh (about 
4.4 €/million BTU, uncorrected for fuel efficiency) and in the scenario in which 
new gas will be allocated free CO2 emission rights, new entry becomes a threat 
only with a CO2 price of slightly above €30/tCO2. At that moment gas replaces 
lignite in the merit order which increases the load factor of gas sufficiently to 
reduce average fixed costs. Comparison with the variable costs of incumbents 
(i.e. Bertrand competition) is the most negative scenario for new gas. Not 
surprisingly, the Cournot scenario improves the opportunities for the entrants. 
With a residual market demand price elasticity of 0.75, new gas entry would 
become profitable at a CO2 price of €23.7/tCO2, which corresponds to a gross 
electricity price of €51.9/MWh; taking the gas (coal) CO2 emission rate of 0.35 
(0.75), the resulting net (Cournot) electricity price would thus be €43.6/MWh 
(€34.1/MWh), which would leave some room to increase the current EEX price, 
but not much. 
 The key point is the difference between free and paid allocation of CO2 
rights to new plant. Assuming Bertrand price competition, the calculations 
strongly suggest that new gas entry would be profitable at a CO2 price of 
€30/tCO2 with free allocation, but not if the rights are auctioned. In other words, 
if the CO2 rights are free, catching up on lignite facilitates entry. If, on the other 
hand, they are auctioned to new plant, the price should be high enough to catch 
up on coal. In all, it may be expected that free allocation of the CO2 emission 
rights mimics an ‘as-if’ capacity element and thus has the effect of stimulating 
new entry. Whether the effect is strong enough, depends on the CO2 price. Thus, 
the NAP as it stands, stimulates (the threat of) new entry in generation and, 
thereby, competition, and at the same time counters the threat of low supply 
security. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
For both the gas and electricity markets, Germany opted for negotiated Third 
Party Access. Neither worked well and as a result the German government gave 
up protecting its electricity and gas industries, paving the way for the European 
Commission to remove negotiated TPA as an option in the recent EU Energy 
Directives. In the meantime, although delayed, a new Energy Act is in 
preparation in Germany, implementing the new Directive. The new Energy Act 
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installs a sector-specific regulator (REGTP) and authorises the regulator to give 
ex ante approval of the methodology  to calculate the network charges. The 
control of the level of network charges is currently discussed in government; 
whereas ex-post control was long preferred, the government now shifts to ex-
ante control. The new Energy Act further aims at strengthening the unbundling 
requirements, but only as minimally required by the Directive. The interaction 
of the two changes is crucial. If the regulation of the network charges is 
effective, we may expect that the vertically integrated companies will 
increasingly shift attention away from the network towards the competitive 
businesses. This will have two results. First, in order to make profits in the 
competitive businesses, the margins (in generation and retail) should be 
increased. It seems that by September 2004 this can already be observed. 
Second, to avoid the margins being competed away by third parties, there will 
be a stronger incentive to discriminate against third parties via the network. 
Increasing discrimination of third parties will encourage regulatory pressure for 
further unbundling. 
 Following the principle of negotiated TPA, association agreements 
have set a general framework for network access, whereas the level of network 
charges was left to the network operators. For electricity, the agreements did 
facilitate non-discriminatory access which worked reasonably well, but the fact 
that the network charges were unregulated resulted in a margin squeeze of the 
competitive stages. The result is bad for competition and new entry and thereby 
new investment, which of course has negative consequences for supply security. 
For gas, the association agreements were a disaster. An explanation offered here 
is that one of the parties in the negotiations (BASF being a large owner of 
WINGAS) was at the same time a (developing) competitor at the network level. 
In all, it seems that the problems in the GSI broke the system, whereas in the 
ESI it is unclear how things would have developed. 
 There is reason to be optimistic about the perspectives of the new 
regulation; in particular that it will have authority to gather information and has 
a budget to start off with a staff of 60. As mentioned, the type of regulation can 
be either ex ante or ex post. If ex post, it will be classical rate-of-return 
regulation; the combination of a reasonable rate of return as the basis for 
regulation and ex post control, which follows from ex ante  approval of the 
method, causes the regulatory lag to be zero. A shift towards ex-ante (incentive-
based) regulation should be welcomed. In practice, it may well be that nothing 
more is needed than to explicitly allow and enlarge the regulatory lag: the 
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control period for which the regulator commits to leave the allowed price 
(formula) unchanged. 
The new institutional framework also affects investment in generation. 
Examination of capacity suggests that, for the moment, there is still sufficient 
generation capacity. However, the reserve margin decreases and, especially if 
the nuclear phase-out takes off, new investment seems to be required. There is 
reason to be optimistic. First, the concerns expressed above depend on the actual 
phasing out of nuclear power, which is highly uncertain. At the same time, the 
uncertainty around nuclear power hinders new investment severely. Second, the 
arrangements for renewables (especially wind) are still favourable and largely 
independent of market developments. Third, as explained above, provided that 
regulation of the network access charges is serious, it will strengthen the 
incentives of the integrated firms to increase the wholesale prices. While this 
strengthens the concerns about market power, the increased margin also 
increases the incentives for new entry. Thus, regulation of the network access 
charges induces new entry in generation. Fourth, new entry with CCGT may be 
enhanced by the EU CO2 emission trading system (ETS) which will start 
January 2005. 
In all, after a false start, the institutional arrangements for the German 
ESI are now a better deal for the consumer, but still not the best deal. 
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APPENDIX: TABLES FOR SECTION 4 
Table A1 gives the load factors in relat ion to the CO2 prices. 
 
Table A1: Load factors in dependence on the CO2 price. 
CO2 price 
(€/T CO2) 
Merit order & load factor 
0 - 29.25 L: 0.85 C: 0.59 G: 0.19 
29.25 - 31.50 C: 0.83 L: 0.53 G: 0.19 
31.50 - 32.50 C: 0.83 G: 0.54 L: 0.22 
32.50 -  G: 0.85 C: 0.63 L: 0.22 
L - lignite; C - coal; G - gas 
 
Table A2 gives the precise numbers underlying figure 4. 
 
Table A2: Shoulder values of various prices in relation to the CO2 price; all 
values in € 
 CO2 price 
(€ /tCO2) 
Gas entry 
FREE 
(€/MWh) 
Gas entry 
PAID 
(€/MWh) 
Var. Cost 
Inc. 
(€/MWh) 
Cournot 
(€/MWh) 
0 51.80 51.80 26.32 39.48 Range 
0 29.25 51.80 62.04 36.55 54.80 
29.25 51.80 62.04 36.55 54.80 Range 
1 31.5 51.80 62.82 37.34 56.01 
31.5 36.06 47.09 37.34 56.01 Range 
2 32.5 36.06 47.44 38.27 57.41 
32.5 32.94 44.32 38.27 57.41 Range 
3 43.1 32.94 48.03 48.03 72.05 
 
